A (Very Thin) Market for Sovereign Control by Weidemaier, W. Mark C.
WEIDEMAIER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2017 9:57 AM 
Duke Law Journal Online 
VOLUME 66 JANUARY 2017
A (VERY THIN) MARKET FOR SOVEREIGN 
CONTROL 
W. MARK C. WEIDEMAIER†
These days, most states are franchulates . . . much too small to have 
anything like a jail, or even a judicial system. 
—Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash1 
INTRODUCTION 
The dystopian 1992 novel Snow Crash envisions a world in which 
nation-states have so dissolved that they lack territorial integrity in the 
modern sense. States are essentially franchisors, licensing sovereignty 
to small pockets of territory around the globe. Echoes of this fictional 
dystopia reverberate (surely unintentionally!) through A Market for 
Sovereign Control, Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati’s ambitious 
proposal that international law should facilitate compensated transfers 
of territorial sovereignty.2 Blocher and Gulati do not have such a 
dystopian vision. To the contrary, they envision a global market in 
which wealthy, well-functioning states seek out regions poorly served 
by government, hoping to “provide citizens of . . . dissatisfied regions 
with an expectation of future flourishing . . .”3 The paradigmatic 
transaction would likely involve a disputed border region such as 
Kashmir, but the proposal contemplates the acquisition of any region, 
anywhere, as long as the region’s people approve. If the parent state 
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1.  NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH 128 (reprt. 2003) (1992).
2.  Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797
(2017). 
3.  Id. at 826.
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has denied representation or equal treatment to people in the region, 
it cannot prevent the acquisition (but it may receive compensation).4 
Thus Canada might buy, say, Washington, D.C., whether or not the 
United States wants to sell, if the treatment of D.C. residents by the 
United States constitutes a denial of representation.5 
A Market for Sovereign Control has important intellectual and 
practical ambitions, although it seems to me that these are somewhat 
in conflict. The intellectual ambition is to describe how international 
law might facilitate a welfare-enhancing market in which states 
compete to buy territorial sovereignty over regions. Blocher and Gulati 
stress that such a market might create incentives for good governance, 
adding that competition for “underperforming” regions “could 
improve democratic responsiveness and increase governments’ 
incentives to treat their citizens well.”6 This prospect serves as 
normative justification for a proposal that many will view with 
skepticism. 
The pragmatic ambition is to harness the rules and institutions of 
international law to encourage the peaceful resolution of territorial 
disputes and to provide meaningful exit options to citizens disserved 
by government. To that end, A Market for Sovereign Control envisions 
both “friendly” and “hostile” transfers of sovereignty.7 In a “friendly” 
deal, a parent state voluntarily cedes control over a region in exchange 
for compensation negotiated ex ante. In a “hostile” deal, an acquiring 
state assumes sovereignty over the parent’s objection and pays 
compensation in an amount set ex post by auction or by a tribunal such 
as the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Hostile deals are allowed 
only when the parent state has “denied representation or equal 
treatment” to people in the region.8 There are important practical 
 
 4.  Id. at 815. 
 5.  This is my example, not Blocher and Gulati’s, although it is consistent with their 
proposal. The transaction would require approval by D.C. residents, a finding (plausible) that the 
United States has denied representation, and Canada’s payment of a price determined by auction 
or set by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). 
 6.  Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 800. 
 7.  John F. Coyle, Friendly and Hostile Deals in the Market for Sovereign Control: A 
Response to Professors Blocher and Gulati, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 37, 37 (2017). The friendly and 
hostile categories correspond to Blocher and Gulati’s “property rule” and “liability rule” 
categories. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (categorizing 
entitlements as protected by property, liability, or inalienability rules). 
 8.  Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 819. The authors interpret international law to confer 
a right of remedial secession in cases of severe oppression or genocide. Id. at 806. In such cases, 
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barriers,9 but A Market for Sovereign Control is primarily a thought 
experiment. It wants to persuade readers that international law should 
enable such transactions. 
The conflict between these ambitions arises, in my view, from the 
fact that A Market for Sovereign Control devotes much of its 
intellectual energy to extolling the virtues of a market that almost 
certainly will not exist, and to a type of transaction that almost no one 
appears to want. As noted, Blocher and Gulati envision a market 
populated by willing and ideally competing buyers.10 They invite 
readers to imagine the governance benefits such a market might 
produce. For example, oppressive parent states would face a credible 
threat of losing valuable territory to “hostile” acquirers, and this might 
encourage better governance.11 Yet in all likelihood, there will be few 
buyers and almost never any competition. Among other reasons for 
this,12 modern states appear largely disinterested in the kind of 
transaction central to A Market for Sovereign Control. This is a 
“bundled” transaction in which the acquirer state obtains all of the 
rights, and assumes all of the obligations, of territorial sovereignty. But 
states already can contract for many of the benefits of sovereignty 
without assuming the obligation to govern, and the evidence strongly 
implies a preference for such unbundled transactions. The upshot is 
that, for most regions, there will simply be no buyers. 
On the other hand, it is somewhat puzzling that A Market for 
Sovereign Control links its practical ambitions to the claim that 
international law can facilitate competition over “underperforming” 
regions. Indeed, even Blocher and Gulati seem ambivalent about the 
linkage. By the end of the article, they appear to concede that there 
will be few if any buyers in their market.13 Yet they insist that their 
 
they assert that the oppressed region may secede without the parent state’s consent and without 
paying compensation.  
 9.  See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 7, at 45–46. 
 10.  See, e.g., Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 807 (“But for a market to work, it is 
important for outside nations to consider whether other nations are underperforming in the 
management of their own regions.”). 
 11.  Id. at 816. Although it might instead create more problematic incentives. For instance, 
an oppressive regime might forcibly disperse an oppressed population so as to prevent the 
formation of a voting bloc large enough to force regional secession. 
 12.  For instance, transactions in sovereignty involve substantial political costs for officials in 
both the parent and the acquirer state, which will often prove prohibitive. See, e.g., Coyle, supra 
note 7, at 41. 
 13.  After conceding that sovereignty transactions will be extremely rare, they add: “Our 
hope is that a market for sovereignty can―even if rarely employed; even if used just once―offer a 
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proposal can enable at least some welfare-maximizing transfers of 
sovereignty that would not otherwise occur.14 This is an important and 
worthwhile ambition.15 The difficulty is that, once willing buyers are 
removed from the picture, a different set of questions comes to the 
fore, which A Market for Sovereign Control spends relatively little time 
answering.  
In the final section of this Response, I briefly discuss two of those 
questions. First, in the modern era, states almost never resolve 
territorial disputes through compensated transfers of sovereignty. The 
barriers are not legal, for international law does not forbid such 
transfers,16 and in fact there are many historical examples.17 So why 
would changes to international law make a difference? The question is 
especially apt for the category of “friendly” deals, for Blocher and 
Gulati propose to add an additional legal barrier by conditioning any 
deal on regional consent.18 Perhaps international law can reduce non-
legal barriers? In a provocative but seemingly off-hand comment, 
Blocher and Gulati suggest that their proposed reforms might 
accomplish this by legitimizing compensated transfers of sovereignty.19 
I am skeptical of the claim, but it is an important one that merits further 
inquiry.20 
Second, A Market for Sovereign Control describes how people in 
a dissatisfied region might want to buy independence. Despite my 
skepticism that there will be third-party buyers, there is clearly popular 
support for independence in many regions. Blocher and Gulati propose 
to expand the right to remedial secession now (arguably) recognized 
 
workable solution to actual problems, or at least illustrate a way forward.” Blocher & Gulati, 
supra note 2, at 843. 
 14.  Id. at 837–40. 
 15.  There are obvious benefits to a legal regime that expands the range of options for 
peacefully resolving territorial disputes. Of course, there will be costs as well, including the 
possibility that powerful states will coerce weaker ones to transfer valuable territory at rock-
bottom prices. Id. at 830–33 (discussing the “colonialism objection” to their proposal). On the 
whole, I am agnostic about whether these costs exceed the benefits of allowing compensated 
transfers of sovereignty. 
 16.  2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 682 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th 
ed. 1996). 
 17.  See e.g., Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 808 n.43 (describing the Louisiana Purchase).  
 18.  Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 806–07. 
 19.  Discussing their proposal to require the people of a region to consent to any transfer, 
Blocher and Gulati suggest that adding this requirement “could (perhaps paradoxically) 
encourage more transfers by legitimizing them.” Id. at 807. 
 20.  In theory, if international law could serve this role, there would indeed be buyers in the 
market for sovereignty. 
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by international law in cases of severe oppression21 by giving people in 
a region that has been denied representation or equal treatment the 
right to buy independence. For most regions, however, the right will be 
meaningless without access to substantial external financing, which will 
likely need to be provided on concessional terms.22 Where will this 
financing come from? Blocher and Gulati point to some possible 
sources, but largely defer discussion of this crucial issue. 
I.  TRANSACTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY IN A VERY THIN MARKET 
A Market for Sovereign Control acknowledges that voluntary 
transfers of sovereignty were relatively common in the past, and 
remain compatible with international law, but no longer take place.23 
This presents a puzzle that I wish occupied a more central place in 
Blocher and Gulati’s discussion. It is hard to square the absence of 
voluntary transfers under existing law with claims that revisions to 
international law can produce “cross-border competition among 
governments,”24 prompt nations to “search for underperforming 
regions in other nations,”25 and facilitate a “market-driven 
competition” in which nations vie to provide non-residents with “an 
expectation of future flourishing.”26 Blocher and Gulati recognize this 
difficulty. They concede that there are barriers to negotiated transfers 
of sovereignty and, eventually, that their mechanism may be “rarely 
employed.”27 I think they are right to make the concession, and I only 
wish they took more seriously its implications for their conception of a 
“market” in sovereignty. 
Political actors have many reasons to favor the acquisition of new 
territory. These include, among others, the desire to establish ports or 
 
 21.  On the right to secession generally, see ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, 
AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 334–39 (2004); 
Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 177, 177–78 (1991). 
 22.  The authors have considered similar questions in other work—for example, arguing that 
refugees should have tradable claims against their countries of origin that they can use to finance 
emigration. See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Competing for Refugees: A Market-Based Solution 
to a Humanitarian Crisis, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 53, 59 (2016).  
 23.  Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 809–10. To respect the principle of self-determination, 
the authors would condition such transfers on the consent of the people in the affected region. Id. 
at 811. 
 24.  Id. at 800. 
 25.  Id. at 814. 
 26.  Id. at 835, 826. 
 27.  Id. at 837. 
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military bases, to exploit natural resources, to increase the tax base, to 
eliminate regulatory and other barriers associated with sovereign 
borders, and even to relieve people with shared cultural or ethnic ties 
of oppressive conditions imposed by a foreign state.28 Political actors 
also have many reasons not to want to govern new territory. These 
range from xenophobia to an understandable reluctance to assume 
responsibility for the welfare and security of millions of new citizens.29 
Given these conflicting goals, it should be no surprise that states 
prefer to avoid bundled transactions in which the acquirer obtains the 
full benefits and obligations of sovereignty. It is quite routine, however, 
for states to contract—à la carte, as it were—for discrete rights, 
typically, though not necessarily, linked to territorial sovereignty. For 
example, states routinely contract for territorial rights by leasing land 
for embassies and military bases. They routinely contract for the rights 
to build infrastructure and to exploit natural resources outside their 
borders.30 Indeed, states can at least partially achieve almost any 
objective without assuming full sovereignty over territory. For 
example, a state can partially relieve oppressive conditions imposed on 
people in a foreign state simply by adopting looser immigration policies 
(at least if the oppressive government allows or cannot prevent 
emigration).31 None of these options is a perfect substitute for 
sovereignty, but each involves dramatically lower costs for the 
acquirer. Unbundled transactions are less costly for “sellers,” too. 
Political actors in the host state can pursue financial and diplomatic 
objectives without incurring the costs associated with an outright 
transfer of sovereignty. 
 
 28.  Id. at 801–02. 
 29.  Id. at 837. 
 30.  As just one of hundreds of examples, consider China’s contracts with Burma (Myanmar) 
and other nations to build dams and other infrastructure projects associated with the production 
of hydroelectric power. See, e.g., Andrew Higgins, Chinese-Funded Hydropower Project Sparks 
Anger in Burma, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
asia_pacific/chinese-funded-hydropower-project-sparks-anger-in-burma/2011/10/17/gIQAGYFf
xM_story.html?utm_term=.c7423e545524 [https://perma.cc/ERJ3-9BT4]. This is not necessarily 
to say that these contracts are always welfare-maximizing. See, e.g., Diana Hulova, Myanmar’s 
Debt: What’s Behind the Speedy Efforts to Restructure It?, EUR. NETWORK ON DEBT &  
DEV. (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.eurodad.org/Entries/view/1544601/2013/02/14/Myanmar-s-debt-
What-s-behind-the-speedy-efforts-to-restructure-it [https://perma.cc/V7X2-QDEH] 
(questioning the legitimacy of Chinese loans to Myanmar to fund infrastructure projects led by 
Chinese companies). 
 31.  Achieving this goal through immigration policy, rather than the assumption of 
sovereignty, also allows the state to select among potential entrants.  
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This is all fairly obvious, and certainly not news to Blocher and 
Gulati. They know that states commonly transact for discrete 
territorial and economic rights and indeed believe this widespread 
practice lends credence to their proposal: “[S]overeignty is already ‘for 
sale’ in various forms,”32 so what’s so radical about proposing rules to 
facilitate an outright transfer? It seems to me, however, that the 
ubiquity of unbundled transactions in sovereignty illustrates a key flaw 
in their account: there is almost no demand for bundled transactions.33 
One reason is that, especially in the post-World War II world, a 
relatively robust legal infrastructure supports unbundled foreign 
investments. This includes treaties supporting international trade as 
well as multilateral treaties such as the New York Convention34 and the 
Washington Convention,35 which help assure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements and awards. Likewise, the proliferation of 
bilateral investment treaties has given capital-exporting states 
assurance that their citizens’ foreign investments will be protected.36 In 
consequence, wealthy states can pursue economic and political 
objectives abroad—both directly and through proxies—without 
assuming full territorial sovereignty. Before World War II, the legal 
infrastructure supporting unbundled investments was much weaker, 
and this may partially explain why outright transfers of sovereignty 
were more common.37 
All of this implies that full transfers of sovereignty will be 
exceptionally rare, and confined to cases in which it is impossible, or 
prohibitively costly, to negotiate an unbundled transaction. This 
primarily means cases in which two (or, rarely, three) states dispute 
 
 32.  Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 801. 
 33.  Blocher and Gulati come close to acknowledging this. Id. at 837 (noting “nations have 
less need to acquire territory than in the past”). But, I do not believe they fully appreciate its 
implications for their view of the “market.” 
 34.  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 7 I.L.M. 1047 (1968). 
 35.  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
 36.  This is not to say the empirical effects of these developments are clear. See, e.g., Jason 
Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of 
(International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 807 
(2008) (finding no clear link between strong investor protections in BITs and foreign investment). 
 37.  I am by no means suggesting that these legal developments fully account for the lack of 
outright sales. Other factors likely played a much more significant role, including the creation of 
relatively robust democratic institutions that made it difficult to dispose of territory without 
accounting for the interests of the affected population. See Paul B. Stephan, Blocher, Gulati, and 
Coase: Making or Buying Sovereignty?, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 51, 55 (2017). 
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ownership of land itself, or the treatment of the people on it. The fact 
that states do not presently settle such disputes in this manner (despite 
this being permitted by international law) implies that these situations 
will be exceptionally rare.38 More fundamentally, to the extent that 
such settlements resemble transactions in a “market,” the conditions 
are those of a bilateral monopoly,39 not a competition in which multiple 
buyers “search for underperforming regions.”40 Perhaps a few regions 
will attract the interest of a buyer (in exceptional cases, two).41 For 
these regions, the possibility of a transfer of sovereignty (“friendly” or 
otherwise) may or may not improve governance.42 For most other 
regions, there will be no buyers at all. 
II.  ENCOURAGING TRADES; FINANCING INDEPENDENCE 
The thought experiment central to A Market for Sovereign 
Control is important and worthwhile, as are the pragmatic ambitions 
that motivate it. Blocher and Gulati convincingly argue that transfers 
of sovereignty can enhance welfare and that international law should 
bestow greater exit rights on people who suffer from oppression or 
poor governance. In many respects, my critique is primarily about 
framing. The focus on competition and market-driven governance 
arguably distracts from more important questions about whether 
international law and institutions can mitigate other barriers—many of 
them non-legal—to welfare-enhancing border changes. In both 
friendly and hostile deals, the barriers include not only a lack of 
demand but extraordinarily high transaction costs.43 In the case of a 
region asserting the right to buy its independence, barriers include the 
 
 38.  See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 7, at 49. Of course, in the “hostile” deal category, the seller 
is removed from the equation. But this does not change the buyer’s assessment of whether it 
wishes to bear the full costs of governance.  
 39.  A bilateral monopoly is a market featuring only a single buyer and seller. See Donald 
Rutherford, ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 49 (3d ed. 2013). 
 40.  Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 814. 
 41.  The most plausible candidates for a transfer of sovereignty identified in A Market for 
Sovereign Control prove the point―e.g., Crimea (Ukraine and Russia), Hans Island (Denmark and 
Canada), and the Falkland Islands (Argentina and the United Kingdom). 
 42.  For instance, one might wonder whether Russia’s acquisition of sovereignty over Crimea 
will, over the long term, improve governance for the region. 
 43.  See Coyle, supra note 7, at 40–43 (discussing political costs associated with voluntary 
transfers of control);), Stephan, supra note 37, at 55 (discussing transaction costs associated with 
granting a blocking right to people in the affected region and the difficulty of designing 
mechanisms to determine whether and at what price regions can buy independence).  
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lack of clear remedies if a parent state refuses to respect the right44 and 
difficulties in obtaining the necessary financing. I suspect that Blocher 
and Gulati have a great deal to say on these subjects. On several 
occasions, they drop tantalizing hints, two of which are especially 
worthy of further elaboration.  
First, might changes to international law reduce the political costs 
associated with ceding or acquiring new territory? It is not hard to see 
why political actors might be reluctant to cede or acquire territory. 
Those in the parent nation risk looking weak or ineffectual. Those in 
the acquiring state risk looking colonialist (to people in the acquired 
region), triggering nativist sentiments (among current citizens), or 
otherwise provoking political opposition. Somewhat paradoxically, 
however, Blocher and Gulati suggest that their proposed requirement 
of regional consent might “encourage more transfers by legitimizing 
them.”45 
At first glance, the claim is surprising. International law derives 
legitimacy from consent. A rule attains the status of international law 
because states consent to it via treaty or because the rule describes a 
widespread practice that states perceive as obligatory.46 Because states 
will not consent to rules they view as illegitimate, it is more natural to 
say that international law follows from, rather than creates, perceptions 
of legitimacy. Blocher and Gulati propose the opposite pathway. The 
underlying notion is that articulation of a new rule of international 
law—here, a rule confirming that sovereignty may be transferred for a 
price but adding a requirement of regional consent—would make 
states more, rather than less, willing to transfer sovereignty. For 
instance, regional consent might allow political actors in the parent 
state to appear democratically accountable rather than ineffectual, and 
political actors in the acquiring state to appear benevolent rather than 
rapacious. This is plausible, though I remain skeptical. After all, 
modern states already can solicit regional consent before implementing 
a transfer of sovereignty, yet they do not do so. Still, the question is an 
important one. For instance, perhaps the political costs of this sort 
explain why there appear to be no buyers in the market for sovereign 
control. If international law can change the political calculus, this might 
change. 
 
 44.  See Coyle, supra note 7, at 46–47. 
 45.  See Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 807. 
 46.  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060. 
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A second set of questions relates to the mechanism for financing 
regional bids for independence. As Blocher and Gulati note, some 
relatively wealthy regions might prefer autonomy and have the 
financial resources to buy it; Catalonia comes to mind.47 For such 
regions, Blocher and Gulati’s proposal offers a pathway to 
independence—although only if the parent state consents or has 
denied representation or equal treatment to people in the region. I 
suspect, however, that most poorly governed regions would require 
massive amounts of external financing. A parent state’s failure to invest 
in citizen welfare and productivity would diminish regional economic 
prospects at least in the short term, so I doubt many oppressed regions 
could access sufficient capital at market rates. If that is so, then the 
right to secede would be meaningless unless the international 
community arranged for financing on concessional terms. The fact that 
secessionist movements will often involve some degree of violence or 
military conflict—and thus leave a seceding region with diminished 
economic prospects—will only increase the need for financial support. 
Blocher and Gulati rightly point out that other states and 
international institutions have incentives to prevent violent secession 
and already devote tens of billions of dollars to development aid. 
Rather than “pay for military intervention or nation rebuilding,” why 
not provide financial backing to a region’s bid for independence?48 I 
am tempted to reply that, in the absence of a credible mechanism for 
enforcing the region’s right to secede, the international community will 
have to underwrite the region’s independence bid and provide 
concessional loans for nation-rebuilding. That is because many parent 
states will oppose secession, with force if necessary, so that “border-
changing treaties” are likely to be preceded by a period of conflict.49 
More generally, it is not clear to me that wealthy states have the 
political will to provide the substantial financial assistance necessary to 
make a poorly governed region’s threat to secede credible. To return 
to a theme central to my critique of A Market for Sovereign Control: 
without willing buyers or massive amounts of financial assistance, 
poorly governed regions cannot credibly threaten to prompt a transfer 
of sovereignty. In turn, oppressive regions will have no reason to 
govern better. 
 
 47.  See Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 839. 
 48.  Id. at 815. 
 49.  Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
As I have noted, my criticisms of A Market for Sovereign Control 
are largely about framing. Even if Blocher and Gulati’s thought 
experiment were feasible to implement, I am skeptical that it would 
materially improve incentives for good governance. But perhaps we 
should take their proposal not as they have framed it, but as an attempt 
to articulate one (of many) possible ways to facilitate exit by citizens 
who are poorly served by government. The authors have given this 
question a great deal of thought, and A Market for Sovereign Control 
represents, in some respects, their most ambitious proposal to date. 
Although I am not entirely persuaded by their thought experiment, I 
cannot deny that international law and institutions often fail precisely 
where they are needed most. Around the world, borders both physical 
and legal block people from finding safety or a path to a better life. 
Blocher and Gulati may not be able to remove the physical barriers, 
but they are right to question the legal ones. 
 
